Grupo Spurrier is the leading company in the provision of strategic information on economic and political issues regarding Ecuador, which we monitor through Weekly Analysis and Análisis Semanal. We specialize in economic research, competition advice, market research, business plans, and workshops in economic scenarios and regulatory changes.
The National Development Plan 2025–29 has been approved, carried out with intense participation from civil society, and sets commendable social development goals for the five-year period. But unlike classical development plans, it does not include growth targets. According to the Plan, how will employment increase? How will poverty be reduced? What is expected of public investment and foreign investment? What is the growth target for tourism? The Plan expresses satisfaction with economic policies, which is inconsistent since Ecuador has experienced a decade of minimal growth and last year GDP contracted by -2%. What changes in economic policy could lead to higher growth? In this issue, we analyze the National Development Plan of Daniel Noboa’s government for the 2025–2029 period (from now on PND 2025-2029). PND 2024–2025 was covered in WA 2024#41. We also review industrial policy.
The 2025 Budget looks like a catalog of impossible aspirations. Although the Constitution requires increasing spending on health and education every year, in practice, there are never enough real funds that remain far below what was promised. The Budget reveals a total deficit of $5.6B (4.4% of GDP), with a significant portion of permanent spending financed by debt. Constitutional rules allow for these exceptions, but in practice, they consolidate a public finance structure that is highly dependent on indebtedness. Capital revenues include $4.7B corresponding to supposed hydrocarbon block tenders that will not materialize in the 100 days remaining until the end of the year. To what extent can fictitious revenues continue to be inflated to balance the Budget? What happens if the planned tenders and concessions do not materialize? The 2025 Budget also reflects a strong discrepancy with the IMF program that was adjusted in July 2025: the Budget proposes maintaining a strong deficit in the four-year period, while the IMF requests its elimination. Can the 2025 Budget really be aligned with the IMF program?
The rebound that began at the start of the year continued throughout H1, with 3.9% y-o-y growth, and the freshest indicators suggest it persisted in July and August. Sales reflect the good momentum of the services sector, though not of manufacturing and construction, while banks are lending more than they are raising in new deposits. What are the prospects for this rebound to continue this year and turn into sustained growth? Is the labor market improving? What is the trend in interest rates? What can be expected of the oil price? Is the Treasury reducing arrears, as it committed to the IMF? In this issue we update our review of the economy’s performance based on the indicators available at the beginning of September. WA#32 contains the review with indicators available at the start of August.
The Esmeraldas refinery faces a succession of problems that disrupt its operation, and fuels imports are constantly increasing. How much did annual fuel output fall? What is the price difference between imported fuels and exported crude oil? What measure has the government taken to reduce the cost of imported fuels? What investment projects do the authorities propose to reactivate refining? Fuel consumption increased 1.4% in the semester. UNO, a Honduran company, will enter the fuel distribution market, replacing Primax. A new methodology has been introduced for the floating of gasoline prices. How does the Ecuador and Houston gasoline prices compare?
The scaffolding of global trade was shattered by Trump’s tariffs. The system was already fractured by China’s industrial policy, which knew how to exploit its weaknesses. Ecuador now faces a 15% tariff on its sales to the U.S. Washington justifies the high tariff by citing a surplus in bilateral trade. National figures indicate that Ecuador actually has a deficit. Why the discrepancy? How will the “Liberation” tariff affect each of Ecuador’s exports? In which markets does it gain an advantage over its competitors, and in which does it lose? Which products will have better prospects, and which less? With the collapse of the international trade system, what strategy should be followed? In this issue, we address foreign trade in the context of Q1 2025. In WA 2024 #34 we covered this topic for the same period in 2024. The last time we examined trade was in WA #20, when we reviewed Q1 data.
On July 8, Daniel Noboa’s government signed a new Letter of Intent with the IMF to receive financial and technical support. Contrary to what critics and labor unions claim, the IMF program does not contemplate a reduction in nominal public spending. The goal is for spending to grow more slowly than the economy. Therefore, in relative terms, spending will carry less weight. The other side of the coin of projected spending growth is a tax increase to finance it. The tax reforms approved in 2024 yielded the equivalent of 1.2% of GDP. The government has committed to implementing additional tax reforms equivalent to 1.6% of GDP between 2025 and 2028. Why was the adjustment need raised from a total of 5.5% of GDP to 6.6%? What are the government’s structural reform commitments with the IMF? What tax changes should be expected? How will fuel subsidy reductions be implemented? What changes are being announced for the financial sector, mining, and the electricity sector?